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T WENT Y-FIRST- CENTURY INNOVATION
PATHWAYS FOR THE U.S. NAV Y IN THE
AGE OF COMPETITION
James A. Russell

A

s the Trump administration assumed the reins of power in 2017 with the
promise of a maritime revival, it took command of a USN surface fleet primarily consisting of vessels designed during the Cold War. This fact is not surprising, since ships’ life cycles can span many decades. The leadership of the Navy
believes, perhaps rightly, that its Cold War–era surface fleet may be ill equipped
to deal with myriad future threats on the high seas over the rest of a century that
will be marked by near-peer competition. The new century promises a range of
new hardware and technologies combining with different maritime strategies,
operations, and tactics that could challenge U.S. primacy on the world’s oceans.
For example, both China and Russia actively are pursuing maritime strategies
involving the extensive use of land-based precision-strike complexes that feature
long-range, accurate munitions and a new generation of digital sensors. China
in particular has developed a new suite of “gray-zone” tactics that seek to test the
limits of how states apply force on the high seas. These different strategies and
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As Admiral John M. Richardson emphasized repeatedly when he was U.S.
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Navy believes it may be falling behind its
opponents at sea. Underlying Richardson’s disquiet was the assumption that time
and fate are not necessarily on the Navy’s side—a view that American political
leaders echoed consistently. After nearly two decades of antijihadist campaigns,
there is a belief that in the digital age adversaries are adapting more quickly than
the U.S. Navy, so it needs to innovate now—and fast—to keep pace with, let alone
preserve any advantage over, its rivals. Richardson clearly believed that the Navy
is entering a new adapt-react cycle with adversaries such as Russia and China,
which informed his call for a twenty-first-century fleet redesign.1 The new cycle
coincides with a shift in U.S. security strategy away from irregular warfare and
terrorism back to the geopolitical competition reminiscent of earlier eras.2
Admiral Richardson’s call for a reinvigorated fleet would not mean much
without high-level political support, especially in Congress. Perhaps not coincidentally, a number of recent studies (some of which the Navy funded) have
recommended that the Navy increase the size of its surface fleet.3 Perhaps more
importantly, there appears to be strong political support in Congress for the idea
that the Navy should get bigger.4 Thus, at least three important sources of energy
are in place with which to revitalize a twenty-first-century fleet: (1) a general
recognition that adversaries are adapting quickly to challenge the United States
on the high seas; (2) internal Navy emphasis on overhauling and expanding the
fleet; and (3) political support to make available the funds necessary to pay for
it. Even three such ingredients, however, do not ensure the success of the kind of
naval revival the U.S. Navy has made previously at various points in its history.
Most importantly, the Navy needs programs that will take a redesigned twentyfirst-century fleet from the drawing board to the production line.5
As the Navy stands on the threshold of the largest naval buildup since the halcyon John Lehman days in the Reagan administration, the irony of this situation
is painfully apparent. Just as a consensus has emerged among stakeholders in the
Department of Defense, the White House, and Congress that the Navy needs to
increase its fleet from 308 to 355 ships, the Navy must address serious shortcomings in its capacity to conceive, develop, and build ships fit for battle.6 Recent
programs such as the littoral combat ship (LCS), the Zumwalt-class guidedmissile destroyer, and the Ford-class aircraft carrier all have highlighted the
Navy’s failure to produce innovative, affordable ships in the quantity and of the
quality needed to configure a larger, redesigned fleet. Unless the Navy can address
mistakes made in these programs it will have difficulty innovating as Richardson
has suggested—with potentially disastrous consequences. This article argues
that the Navy needs to examine critically its largely failed attempts at innovation
during the post-1990s era if it is to meet its twenty-first-century challenges.
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The article particularly focuses on the naval innovation cycle of the modern era,
an era that flowed from the 1990s. This period featured the so-called revolution in
military affairs (RMA) and the absence of near-peer competitors on the high seas
in the wake of the 1990–91 Gulf War. Despite massive investments and the waterfall of 1990s digital technologies, most observers would agree that the Navy has
not been successful at generalizing innovations into a new fleet design. Attempts to
introduce three important ship classes (the LCS, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and
the Ford-class carrier) have been nothing short of disastrous. The Navy intended
that these ships would be cornerstones of the twenty-first-century fleet, but each
ship class foundered, for a variety of reasons. The Navy gave up on purchasing its
planned complement of LCSs and now is planning on decommissioning the first
four ships in the class a decade early (opting for a new frigate instead); it stopped
construction altogether on the Zumwalt-class destroyer; and the Ford-class carrier
program remains mired in technical problems, schedule delays, and cost overruns.
This article addresses the U.S. Navy’s initial attempt to assemble a twentyfirst-century fleet. Starting, as it did, with the world’s largest and most combateffective navy, the United States, in its efforts to design, build, and field a fleet,
provides the world’s best case study by which to examine the intersection of
innovation, maritime strategy, and fleet design.7 The article nests the ongoing
efforts to assemble a twenty-first-century fleet within cycles of naval innovation
and maritime strategy over a period that, for purposes of this analysis, began in
the 1880s and extends to the present.
This article explores the reasons why the post-1990s innovation cycle failed
to move the Navy successfully in the direction for which Admiral Richardson advocated. Identifying and addressing the causes of failure in the latest
innovation cycle are critical if the Navy hopes to design and build a twentyfirst-century fleet successfully. If the problems of the post-1990s innovation
cycle are not resolved the same mistakes likely will be repeated, catapulting
the U.S. Navy into a dark future amid great-power competition; the Navy will
be designing the future fleet continuously even as the present fleet continues
its slow, expensive erosion. The result will be a future fleet design that remains
an alluring, but ultimately a cursed, chimera—always offering a promise that
cannot be realized, because of the array of impediments identified in this
article.
INNOVATION CYCLES—PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
Admiral Richardson’s call to focus on the future fleet is not new, but rather is a
time-honored tradition for all militaries seeking to position themselves favorably
to meet future strategic uncertainties. The Navy envisioned a redesigned twentyfirst-century fleet long before Richardson arrived on the scene. Ideas derived
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in the 1990s called for development of a host of innovative platforms stuffed full
of new technologies and advanced capabilities that were to form the basis of the
twenty-first-century fleet.
This article does not argue that the Navy has not introduced new operational
concepts or integrated new, innovative capabilities into the fleet since the 1990s—
far from it. The Navy has digitized the existing fleet, adding new radars, sensors,
communications equipment, and weapons to its existing ships, all of which have
improved operational awareness and given crews afloat, as well as in the air,
more-accurate, longer-range missiles to strike targets ashore and at sea. Looking
to the future, it currently is experimenting with new operational concepts such as
distributed maritime operations; launching programs to explore the possibilities
that remotely piloted vessels offer; and introducing an array of new, digital-age
technologies into the fleet that are meant to help win the next war on the high
seas. Be that as it may, it still is hard to argue that the post-1990s innovation cycle
has delivered fully on its promise of a twenty-first-century fleet design that looks
dramatically different from that of the Cold War era.
One can argue that there have been three major cycles of naval innovation,
spanning the late nineteenth, the twentieth, and now the twenty-first centuries.
These cycles had many characteristics in common: continuous and iterative
changes to organizational structures to accommodate new equipment and new
operational concepts; the integration of new technologies to improve capabilities;
different platforms and new weapons; and the operational concepts behind these
systems, which in turn drove manning and training so as to integrate all the above
into an effective operational force.
The glue binding these cycles together was the myriad organizations capable
of generalizing the ideas and producing them in repeatable form—bureaucracies
that successfully managed, and even directed, the innovation cycles.8 Indeed, a
characteristic of the support bureaucracy is that it also changed during the innovation cycles, becoming ever more task specialized so it could manage the
increasingly complex systems being fielded during the twentieth century. This
task specialization has produced its own unintended consequences, as will be
discussed later.
The first cycle saw the rise of the new Navy in the 1880s, with a transition to
the big-gun dreadnought and the airplane and aircraft carriers of World War II—a
fifty-year endeavor. The second cycle extended through the end of the Cold War,
featuring nuclear weapons and reactors, radars and other electronics, and longrange missiles—a forty-year effort. Today we are in the midst of the third cycle,
which began in the early 1990s under the rubric of the RMA.9 Defining these
cycles as discrete, definable phenomena is a bit of scholarly artifice, since all the
cycles overlapped in detail and were related to one another even as the geostrategic
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circumstances surrounding the cycles shifted over time. For example, the fielding of the Aegis guided-missile cruisers in the 1980s represented a continuation
of efforts to equip carrier battle groups with air-defense systems that could hit
targets with greater accuracy and at far greater ranges in the face of Soviet tactics
than initially had been the case when carrier battle groups were conceived during
World War II. Another factor binding the cycles is the inherent nature of fleets
themselves; they are composed of surface ships, submarines, and airplanes as the
principal platforms. In the case of ships, their life cycles, stretching over many decades, ensured that ships built to battle the Soviet fleet on the high seas continued
patrolling the world’s oceans in the post–Cold War era; therefore, they performed
a variety of different missions created by a new strategic environment, one of
post-1991 strategic dominance and of post-2001 strikes against jihadi insurgents.
Nonetheless, segregating these distinctive eras is useful for illustrative purposes
to address the phenomenon of designing a twenty-first-century fleet—an activity
that itself resulted from twentieth-century innovation cycles.10
It is no coincidence that these three innovation cycles correspond to different
eras of maritime strategy: the period of naval rivalry in the imperial age that began
in the late nineteenth century and extended through the end of World War II; the
Cold War, which pitted the United States and its allies against the Soviet Union on
the high seas; and the post-1990 era that, until recently, saw the United States in
its celebrated unipolar moment. During the 1990s, for example, the Cold War–era
carrier battle group gradually was abandoned and carriers often operated essentially independently, since such vessels faced no real threats on or under the water
or from the skies. That has changed in the twenty-first century as states such as
North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia aggressively have developed precision-strike
complexes with land-based sensors and long-range ballistic missiles.11 A conclusion of this article is that the conceptual drift in maritime strategy in the third
cycle profoundly shaped the Navy’s initial attempts to design and build a twentyfirst-century fleet.
Each of these innovation cycles introduced new capabilities and operating concepts into the fleet. It is easy to forget, however, that each of the cycles was fueled
by one important common denominator: money, as an expression of policy and
legislative will. Without money, none of the innovation cycles could have been
brought to fruition—another timeless truism, which speaks to enduring realities
about how defense and arms work in American politics and the record of the U.S.
Navy in modern history. A regrettable and potentially devastating feature of the
modern era’s innovation cycle is a cost growth of ships, aircraft, and projectiles
that is unsustainable, even given a U.S. defense budget that in 2018 was almost
larger than the defense expenditures of the rest of the world combined. In addition to programmatic ship-construction problems, significant cost growth has
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characterized virtually every major procurement program the Navy has undertaken in the period. In short, the post–Cold War innovation cycle ran aground in
the minefield of unacceptably high costs—even in a time when the defense budget
topped $700 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2018.12
The exemplar of this phenomenon is the $406 billion F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
program, currently estimated to be the most expensive weapons program in
American history.13 Regrettably, the experience of the F-35 has proved emblematic
for the Navy’s twenty-first-century fleet-design aspirations. The cost growth of
air and sea platforms initially conceived in the 1990s has all but ensured that the
Navy will be unable to field large numbers of the new Ford-class aircraft carriers,
San Antonio–class amphibious transport dock LPD-17 ships, and Virginia- and
Columbia-class submarines—all of which, like the LCS and DDX, were intended
to be cornerstones of the twenty-first-century fleet. The Navy’s newly conceived
FFG(X) guided-missile frigate is anticipated to cost nearly one billion dollars per
vessel.14 The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the Navy would need
an increase in its shipbuilding budget averaging 60 percent annually for the next
thirty years to reach its desired end state of a fleet of 355 ships between 2035 and
2047—which is significantly more than Congress has appropriated for shipbuilding at any time over the last thirty years.15 An undeniable feature of the post–Cold
War innovation cycle is that the Navy is pricing itself out of business with underfunded shipbuilding plans—at a time when Russia and China are expanding the
sizes of their respective fleets.16
THE STRATEGY-INNOVATION NEXUS
A purposeful adapt-react interaction between and among rivals drove the innovation cycles of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as the Navy sought
to lead its allies and keep ahead of its enemies. Cycles of action and reaction between adversaries are not new; indeed, they are a timeless feature of international
politics. Early international relations theorists of the realist school noted that
states seek armaments both to defend themselves and because they see them as
a way to influence friends and adversaries.17 Like land and air forces, the navies
of developed states inherently are nested within this larger phenomenon. Navy
fleets historically have been deemed a vital, even a foundational, part of national
power.18 This underlying tension of international politics produces a timeless rule
applicable to these interactions: as nations arm themselves, they create insecurity
in both friends and rivals, who then feel compelled to take corresponding actions,
resulting in arms races.19
Innovation by antagonists in arms races is a central feature of the phenomenon, as each participant strives to counter the capabilities of the other.20 Navies
around the world went through such an adapt-react cycle in the dreadnought era.
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It happened again in the aircraft carrier era in the first half of the twentieth century—a cycle in which the U.S. Navy undeniably came out on top of its enemies.21
Importantly, these two adapt-react cycles occurred during an era (approximately
1880–1990) in which strong navies were thought of as synonymous with national
power.
The experiences of World War II confirmed already-held beliefs about the
importance of strong navies as instruments of national power and the strong
influence that arms races had on the nature of the forces fielded on the high seas.
During World War II, two types of maritime conflict unfolded, both of which
were central to the Allied victory. In the Battle of the Atlantic, navies served in
a more purely maritime role, in a context in which control over the seas enabled
the application of force on land.22 Allied navies successfully overcame the U-boat
challenge, moved the Army (and the Army Air Forces) across the Atlantic to
Great Britain (as well as supplies to the Soviet Union and across the Mediterranean to North Africa), and then managed to deliver the Army across the channel
into Europe. In the Pacific theater, navies sailed close to shorelines to land troops
and deliver fire directly onto the enemy, and they engaged in naval combat at sea
among surface ships, as naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan had suggested they
would.23 The Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944 was the largest sea battle in history, and it came on the heels of significant sea-based battles in the Coral Sea, at
Midway, and elsewhere that have gained prominent places in the historical annals
of the war in the Pacific. In both theaters, Atlantic and Pacific, navies correctly
were seen as instrumental to the Allies’ ultimate victory in the greatest maritime
campaign in history.24
After World War II, the Cold War featured its own adapt-react cycle, in which
the United States and its allies on one side and Soviet-bloc countries on the other
moved through various attempts to gain and maintain the upper hand. As an example of the cycle, the Soviet submarine buildup during the Cold War spurred the
U.S. Navy to develop a formidable antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability that
incorporated ships, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft, and a fixed sonar network
on the ocean floor, not to mention several classes of nuclear attack submarines.25
For both adversaries, a host of innovations appeared during the cycle. In the Cold
War, the United States developed shipborne missile-launch systems (including
deployment of tactical nuclear weapons at sea), in combination with radar, both to
defend the fleet from new generations of Soviet aircraft and missiles and to attack
targets at long range with sea-launched cruise missiles.26 Perhaps most significantly,
the Navy deployed strategic nuclear missiles on submarines, stabilizing nuclear
deterrence and the balance of terror. Importantly, these arms-race and innovation
cycles depended on the ability of large institutions to produce generalizable innovation—new capabilities that were introduced into the fleet on a widespread basis.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

7

66

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 3, Art. 7

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy’s missions expanded to focus on deterrence
and supporting overseas military operations in Korea and Vietnam. In addition
to these missions it fulfilled and interactions it had with adversaries, interservice
rivalries represented another shaping factor in the Cold War innovation cycle.
While the newly created Air Force received principal responsibility for delivering the strategic nuclear deterrent, the Navy decisively clawed back an important
part of that mission through the Polaris and later the Trident submarine ballisticmissile programs, beginning in the early 1960s.27 In this period, the Navy served
as an important instrument of U.S. national power exercised under the strategy
of containment. During the Cold War, the Navy operated at sea on a continuous
and global basis, which established a concept of operations that continues to this
day. In the 1980s, Navy Secretary John F. Lehman Jr. famously conceived of the
Maritime Strategy to give the Navy an offensive strategic role in a potential war
with the Soviet Union. The Maritime Strategy sought to take the war to the Kola
Peninsula and the Soviet Pacific bases, to secure NATO’s northern flank in Scandinavia and secure Japan, and to bottle up the Soviet navy with its submarine fleet
in its northern bastions.28 Lehman’s concept simply repackaged a version of the
Navy’s maritime contributions during the Pacific War, updating them by applying
the same ideas to a European war with the Soviet Union.
As had been the case in the era prior to and during World War II, Cold War
assessments of adversary capabilities drove the Navy’s innovation efforts, with
the bureaucracy operationalizing them into weapon-system requirements. Those
assessments called for continuous iterative improvements in weapons, operating
platforms, and operating concepts that were focused principally on defeating the
adversary, both via direct confrontation at sea and by applying maritime power
to support a land war. Despite civil-military tension and legislative rancor, the
Defense Department bureaucracy operationalized these requirements successfully, for the most part, which ensured that Navy ships were equipped with newer,
better radars; more-accurate, longer-range missiles; successively better jet aircraft;
shipborne helicopters; and, for submarines, the capability to stay submerged for
longer periods, resulting in greater stealth.29 With the support of Congress, the
Navy procured, fielded, and—importantly—generalized throughout the fleet
weapons, platforms, and technologies that were new, improved, or both. This
description is not intended to romanticize a bygone era in any way; its intent
simply is to emphasize that the bureaucracy successfully operationalized change,
adaptation, and innovation that were linked to strategy, in the form of programs
that delivered systems to the fleet.
However, the strategy-innovation nexus that had functioned with a certain
logic during the first two cycles entered a new period in the post-1990 era, with
important consequences for the processes that had worked successfully in the first
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two cycles. Following the first Gulf War in 1991 and a brief period of a “peace dividend,” the Defense Department and its allies in Congress and industry successfully fought off attempts to reduce dramatically the defense budget and the size
of the military departments. New planning and operational scenarios emerged in
response to threats from “rogue states” such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea; this
preserved force structures, missions, budgets, and programs. Attention focused
particularly on such threats as the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons as well as long-range missiles—threats that came not from near-peer competitors but from weak states that chafed under a U.S.-led global order. As the 1990s
progressed, the Defense Department moved away from specific war planning and
eventually divorced the development of new weapons and operating concepts
from those our enemies were developing. Instead, “capabilities portfolios” were
emphasized, with risk trade-offs between the portfolios, to guide decision-making
on what to develop and buy.30 This way of planning provided civilian decision
makers with tools with which to evaluate the military departments’ choices on
how to spend their money.31
BUREAUCRACY AND INNOVATION
To be successful, all innovation cycles in any military organization depend on
bureaucracy—an organizational structure created to produce repeatable and
predictable outputs, among other purposes. Bureaucracy has a well-deserved
reputation for being resistant to change; in fact, it could be argued that bureaucracy is designed to prevent change. For military organizations, repeatable
output is a foundation of military effectiveness. Military organizations therefore
are reluctant to abandon output, in the form of a practice in the field that has
proved its worth. Conversely, however, it is equally the case that bureaucracy is
instrumental to the process of change and innovation in military institutions. The
tension between accepted practice and change sits at the heart of all questions of
military innovation.
A truism for all modern militaries is that bureaucracy effectively functions as a
translation agent in the innovation process; it takes the ideas for change, then develops a kind of source code that allows each idea to be generalized in the ways initially
envisioned. It falls to bureaucracy to manage the process of innovation and change.
The bureaucracy’s source code for innovation comes in the form of research-anddevelopment (R&D) programs that mature into weapons-procurement programs
and fielded systems, or as guidance that can change operational practice. To be
completely successful, however, innovation cycles must reach the point of generalizability, so the change can be adopted on an affordable, organization-wide basis.
For all military organizations, including navies, the idea of generalizability is
arguably the critical feature of efforts to innovate and produce new systems, new
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operational routines, or both.32 As noted in the previous sections, during the
Cold War the Navy successfully fielded new systems, built new organizations,
and implemented new operational praxes. Many factors spurred the successful
innovation cycle; one was a leadership that saw the potential of new systems, such
as the nuclear-powered reactor for submarine propulsion, sea-launched ballistic
and cruise missiles, radars capable of tracking multiple targets simultaneously, and
missile-defense launch systems integrated on ships. These successful innovations
also flowed from assessments of adversary capability, internal advocates within the
organization who sought to develop a new theory of victory, a changing strategic
environment that translated into a demand for new missions and capabilities,
and interservice rivalries—whose existence is never to be gainsaid—that spurred
organizations to propose new ideas and systems to preserve their missions and
budgets.33
Also worth noting is that during the Cold War the strategic and operational
tasks facing the Navy and its force structure were relatively consistent with the uses
of naval forces that had evolved over the course of the twentieth century. When
the Soviet Union dissolved, however, the U.S. Navy found itself without a competitor on the high seas. In the 1990s, the Navy realized it had to think about what it
wanted its fleet to look like in the twenty-first century—a future that it would have
to conceive of well before it could field a new fleet to operate in it.
So during the ’90s the Navy began to plan to field a twenty-first-century
fleet—for us today, the fleet of the present. In the ’90s the Navy envisioned a
twenty-first-century fleet that would push the boundaries of its previous ship
designs and incorporate a host of new capabilities enabled by the digital revolution. The Navy clearly wanted a twenty-first-century fleet that would incorporate
the newest, most advanced technologies and operational concepts, which would
preserve its leadership position well into the future. The digital revolution of
the 1990s offered the Navy smaller, faster microprocessors that created a new
generation of sensors and more-accurate, longer-range weapons and better
intelligence capacities; real-time communications enabled via the Internet; enhanced situational awareness that promised to pierce the fog of movements at
sea; and missile-defense systems to protect ships and shore-based installations.
The hopefulness of the era of the RMA was not lost on the Navy (or the other
military departments), which aggressively moved to operationalize its vision.
Plans for a variety of new ship classes emerged during the period: the LPD-17 San
Antonio–class amphibious transport dock, the SSN-774 Virginia-class nuclear
attack submarine, two different variants of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer
(Flights I and II), the LCS, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and the Ford-class carrier.
What follows focuses on three of these programs: the LCS, the Zumwalt class, and
the Ford class.
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The Twenty-First-Century Fleet: Program “Highlights”
This section briefly details the history of three ship-construction programs: the
LCS, the DDX, and the Ford-class CVN. All were products of the 1990s-era innovation cycle.
Both the LCS and DDX grew out of decisions the Navy made in 2001 to reorient
an R&D program started in 1994 called the SC-21 program (from Surface Combatant for the 21st Century). The SC-21 program itself grew out of studies dating
to the late 1980s that called for ships that could operate in the Norwegian Sea during a potential war with the Soviet Union. The main idea was to develop a robust
ship capable of attacking targets on land. The 1990s research programs focused
on a number of vessel options, in sizes ranging up to forty thousand tons. One of
its most celebrated proposals was the arsenal ship: a thirty-thousand-ton vessel
stuffed with hundreds of cruise missiles and a vertical launch system. Then-CNO
Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda championed the concept. Research efforts continued
throughout the 1990s and up to the 2001 decision to proceed with two programs:
the LCS and the DDX.34
The LCS Program. The LCS program began in 2001; initial procurement occurred
in 2005; yet as of mid-2019, the LCS has not been deployed to the field in support
of combatant command requirements, owing to persistent technical problems.35
The Navy intended to use the LCS as a smaller, multimission vessel that could take
advantage of “plug and play” modules to perform a variety of different missions:
ASW, mine countermeasures (MCM), and surface warfare against smaller vessels.
Other relevant missions included maritime-security and maritime-partnering
operations, surveillance and reconnaissance, and support to special operations
forces. By mid-2018, thirty-five vessels had been procured from a program that
initially was projected to produce over fifty. The program’s orders were divided
between two contractors (Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics) that provided
different hull designs.36
Virtually every aspect of the LCS has drawn the ire of critics, from both inside
and outside government: costs grew (from initial estimates of $220 million per
vessel to $478 million); early versions of the ships suffered from construction
problems; and development of the modules to support the three mission areas
(ASW, MCM, and surface warfare) has been plagued by repeated and costly delays.
In July 2018, the Pentagon’s inspector general stated that the Navy had declared
the MCM module to be operational without demonstrating that it had fixed the
known problems with it.37 The Navy subsequently abandoned the idea of swapping out the mission modules and instead will equip each vessel with just one of
the modules. Repeatedly the Navy has been forced to delay deployment plans for
the vessels because of these technical problems. There also are persistent concerns
about whether the ship is adequately armed—many doubt it can survive in combat.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

11

70

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 3, Art. 7

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

In December 2016, the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, J.
Michael Gilmore, told lawmakers that the LCS had not demonstrated “effective
warfighting capability in any of its originally envisioned missions: surface warfare
(SUW); mine countermeasures (MCM); anti-submarine warfare (ASW).”38
A year earlier, then–Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter ordered the Navy
to reduce its program from fifty-two to forty vessels and to select a single contractor to construct future vessels. Carter acerbically noted in his missive to the
Navy: “For the last several years, the Department of the Navy has overemphasized
resources used to incrementally increase total ship numbers at the expense of
critically-needed investments in areas where our adversaries are not standing
still, such as strike, ship survivability, electronic warfare, and other capabilities.”39
Carter’s criticisms followed a similar brouhaha in 2014 in which then–Secretary of
Defense Charles T. Hagel ordered the Navy to add armament to the LCS. The then
Senate Armed Services Committee chairman (and former naval aviator) John S.
McCain III (R-AZ) also was a frequent and scathing critic of the LCS from its earliest stages, repeatedly citing “fundamental shortcomings” in the whole program.40
The program displayed a number of embarrassing technical problems, including
hull cracks in the ship’s aluminum superstructure and a faulty propulsion system.
Various vessels had to be towed back to port and, in one case, driven all the way
across the Pacific Ocean for repairs.41
In FY19, the Navy decided to stop procurement of the LCS and instead shift to
procurement of a new frigate in FY20. In December 2019, the Navy announced
that it proposed to retire the first four ships in the LCS class from service more
than a decade early to save money.42 Current plans call for the Navy to build twenty
of the new frigates.43
The DDG-1000 Zumwalt-Class Destroyer. The story of the DDG-1000 program
bears some similarity to that of the LCS—except that in some ways it is worse. The
Navy initially conceived of the ship as the most technologically advanced ever to
be built, one that would substitute for several ship classes, including destroyers
and guided-missile cruisers. It originally was designed to support troops ashore
with long-range, accurate fires, although since then the Navy has shifted the ship’s
mission to one focusing on surface-fire support at sea. The first two ships were
procured in FY06 and FY07.
But less than three years after launching the program the Navy terminated
the DDG-1000 program at three ships, proposing instead to purchase more Cold
War–era DDG-51 Arleigh Burke–class destroyers. The Navy intended the DDG1000 to be a stealth ship, with a small-to-nonexistent radar cross section—the Navy’s version of the Air Force’s F-117 stealth fighter. However, instead of becoming
the basis (along with the LCS) for the twenty-first-century fleet, the DDG-1000
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effectively became an expensive technology demonstrator platform. The Navy underestimated the costs of the program by 47 percent, seeing its initial $8.9 billion
per-ship estimate in FY09 grow to $13.1 billion in FY20.44
The stealth ship was to run as quietly as a submarine; provide greatly improved
battlespace awareness through new sensors; and deliver precise, long-range fires,
via advanced, ship-based guns, to support troops ashore. The promise seemed substantial, boasting a first-of-its-kind integrated power system that would be powered
by a new electric-drive propulsion system that would feed new, power-dependent,
directed-energy and laser weapons. The ship’s modular Linux-based computing
system, with six million lines of software code, was the first onboard computing
environment with its own Internet system. The advanced gun system was to deliver precision, accurate fires with 155 mm long-range, land-attack projectiles at
shore-based targets over a hundred miles away, drawing on an advanced, integrated
combat system. The DDG-1000 was to have been supported by a crew of just under
a hundred, as opposed to the 275 required to operate a Burke-class destroyer; the
Navy subsequently walked back that initial claim to a crew size of 175.45
The DDG-1000 reportedly does in fact have the radar cross section of a fishing
boat. However, almost none of the other promised capabilities has yet been realized, and, like the LCS, the ship has suffered persistent technical problems.
The Ford-Class Carrier. Perhaps the centerpiece of the twenty-first-century fleet
developed during the 1990s was a new generation of aircraft carriers, known as
the Ford class, to replace the aging Nimitz-class fleet that began entering service
in 1975. While it was based on the Nimitz-class hull, the Ford class sought to incorporate a number of important improvements that would enable the ships to
launch more aircraft sorties (a bigger flight deck, additional electrical power for
the ship’s systems) while lowering the number of sailors required to operate the
ship by several hundred, which promised to reduce operating costs. The first ship,
Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), was commissioned in July 2017 after procurement costs
of approximately $13 billion. At least four carriers are to be procured; the Navy
has estimated that the last ship in the class, CVN 81, will cost in excess of $15 billion. The first three ships in the class have seen their costs grow by an average of
21 percent over initial estimates. The Navy has exceeded Congress’s cost caps on
every ship in the program.46
Three major new systems are being integrated into the Ford class: a new
aircraft-catapult system called the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, a new
aircraft-arresting system called the Advanced Arresting Gear, and a new radar
known as dual-band radar. According to the Pentagon’s Office of the Director for
Operational Test and Evaluation, all three systems have been plagued by schedule
delays, cost growth, and reliability problems—which calls into question the ship’s
ability to perform as advertised in combat.47 The office noted the following:
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Poor or unknown reliability of the newly designed catapults, arresting gear, weapons
elevators, and radar, which are all critical for flight operations, could affect the ability
of CVN 78 to generate sorties, make the ship more vulnerable to attack, or create
limitations during routine operations. The poor or unknown reliability of these critical subsystems is the most significant risk to CVN 78. Based on current reliability
estimates, CVN 78 is unlikely to be able to conduct the type of high-intensity flight
operations expected during wartime.48

Frequent Ford-class critic and then–Senate Armed Services Committee chairman John McCain characterized the program as “one of the most spectacular
acquisition debacles in recent memory.”49
As McCain noted (and the Government Accountability Office echoed), the
entire twenty-first-century Navy shipbuilding program, as highlighted in the case
of the Ford class, suffered from a number of easily identifiable maladies:50
• unrealistic business cases that invariably understated costs and underestimated the difficulties of production that relied on unproven technologies,
resulting in schedule delays
• concurrent design and construction, without adequate testing
• lack of testing (and a reluctance to test) to demonstrate advertised capabilities
• new systems that were rushed into production despite the fact that they did
not work
• a bewildering mix of different organizations that were responsible for different parts of the program, which made overall management accountability all
but impossible51
Teething pains are to be expected with any new platform or weapon system,
particularly in the case of complex systems such as surface ships. Each of these
three programs, however, fell prey to the same maladies that McCain noted.
In short, the innovation process meant to operationalize these systems came
unglued. The Navy actually recognized this; it curtailed the DDG-1000 program
at three ships and canceled the LCS program halfway through its planned production run, and the Ford class still faces significant hurdles to deliver on its promise.
Explaining the Perfect Storm
The innovation cycle of the 1990s produced these three flawed platforms, which
represented the Navy’s initial attempt to conceptualize its twenty-first-century
fleet. In the cases of the DDG-1000 and the LCS in particular, nothing quite
like these platforms had been attempted ever before. Both represented aggressive efforts at innovation that could have led to new generations of platforms
that might have started the Navy down the path to its sought-after redesigned
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twenty-first-century fleet. The Ford class represented more of an adaptation than
an innovation (although several brand-new systems, such as the electric catapult,
were introduced). Suffice it to say, if the Navy had succeeded in generalizing these
platforms as initially envisioned, Admiral Richardson might not have felt compelled to call for a redesigned twenty-first-century fleet. Identifying what went
wrong with these programs in this innovation cycle is important if the Navy is
to avoid repeating the mistakes of this first attempt to reconceptualize its fleet.
Importantly, a lack of neither money nor political support doomed the programs; in fact, the situation was quite the opposite. Management within the Navy
and the Pentagon, supported by their providers in Congress, kept hoping for
success and threw ever-increasing amounts of money at the problematic systems.
While it is true that the country and the Defense Department budget increasingly
became focused on commitments associated with the post-9/11 irregular wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Navy’s requests for funding for its twenty-first-century
fleet were met, even as costs ballooned and production delays mounted.52
Choices made after the 1990s represent only part of the story. Just as important
were choices not made that could have produced different innovation pathways.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Navy’s choices were shaped by institutional identity,
institutional preferences, and intrabureaucratic communities (aviators, surface
warfare officers, and submariners) that drove investment priorities in the innovation cycle. For example, the attempt to build an invisible ship was not simply a
matter of coincidence but instead reflected the preferences of the Navy’s powerful surface warfare community, which reside at the heart of the Navy’s strategic
essence. The idea of an invisible/radar-deflecting ship represented an important
attempt at innovation and appeared attractive for lots of obvious reasons. Such a
capability certainly would give the United States an edge on the high seas over its
adversaries, much as the Air Force’s development of its stealth fighter and bomber
gave it similar advantages. The point here is that this choice of developing a stealth
ship also was influenced by powerful institutional preferences.
The preference for a manned aircraft may provide an even better example of
innovation pathways not chosen.53 The 1990s delivered the era of unmanned
systems now on display on a daily basis over America’s global battlefields—an innovation choice that the U.S. Air Force has embraced. In contrast, commitment
to the F-35 represented the naval aviation community’s preference for a manned
platform—which preserved the career track and influence of the community
within the wider institution.
Instead of developing a stealth ship, the Navy instead could have chosen to
develop a stealth drone carrying multiple munitions launched off differently designed ships. Such an investment almost certainly would have posed an engineering problem that was easier and cheaper to solve than building the stealth ship, the
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Ford-class carrier, and the F-35. Instead, the Navy’s strike culture and commitment
to carrier aviation clearly drove its investment strategy in favor of the F-35 aircraft
and the Ford-class carrier.
As institutional preferences drove the investment strategy, no outside countervailing force emerged across the civil-military divide to force a different set of
choices on the Navy. Just as important, no intraorganizational advocates emerged
in the period to challenge accepted institutional orthodoxies with a different theory of victory that might have changed the organization’s investment priorities.54
The point here is not to make a normative argument regarding the relative merits
of manned versus unmanned systems; it is simply to observe that institutional
preferences limited debate encompassing alternative theories of victory that could
have produced different innovation pathways.
When comparing the post-1990s cycle with those that preceded it, the obvious
conclusion is that, in the cases of these three systems, the bureaucracy proved itself
unable to generalize the innovations into executable programs. Bureaucracy could
not fix the shared programmatic flaw that resulted from the disparity between the
speed of technological change and that of the Navy’s plodding acquisition system.
It was clear that systems that in some cases took a decade or more to develop and
field would find themselves out of date when they arrived in the fleet.55 Program
managers and their supervisors understandably were reluctant to nail down system requirements definitively, preferring instead to develop and build systems
simultaneously so that, theoretically, the latest technological advances could be
integrated into their platforms. But at least with regard to these three platforms,
that approach proved disastrous.
For its part, industry obliged customer preferences, then demanded everincreasing amounts of money to fix the flawed systems. A shrinking shipbuilding
industrial base contributed to the debacles by limiting competition and alternatives as program schedules slipped and costs mounted.56 For example, Huntington
Ingalls Industries, headquartered in Newport News, Virginia, is today the only
shipyard in the United States capable of building aircraft carriers such as the Ford
class.
In its quest to generalize the innovation, bureaucracy did adapt successfully to
the ever-increasing complexity of the envisioned systems. Bureaucracy invariably
brought about the task specialization within myriad organizations that was necessary to build technical and management expertise in particular programmatic
areas.57 However, that adaptation did not produce generalizable innovation but
instead ever-more-complex organizations that complicated program oversight
and execution. As the ship classes became more complicated technically, program
responsibilities became diffused across myriad organizations. The creation of different task-specialized organizations created span-of-control problems that made
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it difficult to synchronize and coordinate different program elements. In each of
the three shipbuilding programs, vitally important systems grew disconnected
from production schedules. Instead of one coherent program, ship construction
became a process in which multiple specialized offices each managed different
project elements. Senator McCain complained repeatedly about the many organizations that routinely appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee
for hearings about the Navy’s shipbuilding program. As he noted, it meant that
no single organization or person had overall responsibility for the program, and
hence no accountability could be assigned. An exasperated McCain often complained that nobody lost his job because nobody was held accountable.58 The
bureaucratic enterprise meant to generalize the innovation had become too vast
and complicated as a result of the demands the Navy placed on it. It provided only
what the customer actually asked for.
The bureaucracy’s struggles to generalize the innovation were known widely,
by all the organizations in the chain of command. Management and oversight
within the Navy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and
Congress all failed to correct the sideward spiral of each program; instead these
entities spent even more money, in the belief that the Navy would fix the problems.
Principal-agent relations can explain part of the behavior of the various oversight
layers and entities, but at the end of the day, as McCain emphasized, the entire
management and oversight system—stretching from the Navy all the way to the
halls of Congress—bore responsibility for the expensive acquisition disasters.59
Another feature of the 1990s innovation cycle is that the platforms were conceived initially during the 1990s—a period of conceptual drift in U.S. strategy
following the Cold War. It is not that the Navy was not busy during the 1990s;
far from it. It spent the decade chasing after pirates in various places, conducting humanitarian relief operations, enforcing the trade embargo against Saddam
Hussein in the Persian Gulf, and helping to police the skies over Iraq in Operation
SOUTHERN WATCH. The Navy promulgated a bevy of new documents designed
to convince stakeholders of its continued relevance—and need for money—
pointing to its support of land forces and a host of other global constabulary missions.60 Importantly, over the decade, the Navy saw its fleet shrink by 40 percent,
from 526 to 318 ships, and its personnel end strength decline from 570,000 to
370,000.61
While the Defense Department successfully beat back attempts at generalized
disarmament, which had occurred in Europe, there was no way to gloss over the
lack of strategic consensus driving the arm-train-equip enterprise for the military
departments over the decade. Scenarios involving much weaker, so-called rogue
states eventually were substituted for the threat from the Soviet Union as a reason
to preserve programs and budgets. After the 1990–91 Gulf War and its swift and
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purportedly decisive victory, the RMA offered obvious advantages, and the military departments understandably seized on its promise to guarantee their superiority over potential rivals. The RMA framed war as an engineering problem that
could be solved through clever targeting with better, more-accurate, and longerrange weapons supported by an ever-improving sensor suite that cleared away
the fog of war as if by magic. The RMA offered the prospect of victory through
target destruction via a new generation of digital sensors and long-range, accurate
munitions—a mind-set that implicitly encouraged the Navy and the other services
to bet on the next technological leap before definitively nailing down their system
requirements. Weapon-system requirements gradually became divorced from
specific enemy threats and instead migrated to anodyne portfolios of capabilities.62
The conceptual drift in national strategy fell squarely into the Navy’s lap. The
1990s saw questions implicitly raised about the strategic value of sea power that
challenged foundational assumptions that navies were an instrumental component of national power. In World War II, navies enabled land forces by shipping
men and their equipment to the fight. In the post-1990s era, however, America’s
land forces, instead of storming ashore, mostly flew in chartered commercial airliners to airports in countries near the combat areas. While carrier aviation indeed
supported troops and operations ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan, the reality was
(and remains) that most combat-related air missions could be launched more efficiently from land-based airfields in or near the war zones.63 The Navy insisted on
supporting troops ashore and went to absurd lengths to deliver, such as launching
planes off the coast of Pakistan and sending them, via multiple aerial refuelings,
to linger in lengthy orbits over Afghanistan to support ground troops (making
for missions that Navy pilots described as “eight hours of boredom and twenty
seconds of terror”).64
The institutional preference for—even insistence on—conducting manned
strike operations ashore also profoundly shaped the decision to proceed with the
new generation of Ford-class carriers, which in certain respects were meant to be
the “supercarriers” of the twenty-first century. The Navy never considered viable
alternatives to the Ford-class platform. Congress forced the Navy to study the idea
of building more, smaller, cheaper carriers, as potential platforms for strike missions—an idea in which the Navy appears uninterested for the present.65 There is
little doubt that the Navy remains slow off the mark to adopt unmanned systems,
having missed a golden opportunity during the post-1990s innovation cycle to
get ahead of its competitors. This constituted an enormous opportunity cost of
a road not taken. As strategy scholar James J. Wirtz pointedly observed, “One
wonders exactly what, if anything, will be flying from those Ford-class carriers
in 2063 or whether or not they will be at sea at all. One also wonders why the
Navy plans to maintain and grow its fleet of aircraft carriers even though piloted
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combat aircraft are headed for obsolescence. After all, in 2063 aviators may not
be allowed to drive themselves to an airport. Would humans really still be at the
controls of a combat aircraft?”66
The reluctance to embrace unmanned systems represents a critical missed
opportunity of the post-1990s innovation cycle, but it is unsurprising in an institution whose identity is grounded strongly in its carrier aviation community.
One can only hope that the Ford-class carriers and their F-35 aircraft do not turn
into versions of the Iowa-class battleships of the last century, which were obsolete
even as they arrived.
Perhaps more basically, the Navy and its benefactors were unwilling to confront the uncomfortable reality of the post-1990s era: that unthreatened international trade routes did not need navies to protect them; and that, in any case, they
were growing so full of twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) traffic that no single
actor could disrupt those routes significantly.67 Seaborne support for U.S. military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan represented a mere trickle added to existing
traffic on the vast global seaborne highways. The net effect of this undeniable
feature of a globalizing world undermined traditional twentieth-century notions
of the direct linkage between America’s economic strength through trade and the
Navy’s protection of trade routes.
As in the Cold War era before it, in the 1990s the strategic backdrop framed
the innovation cycle of the era. Yet given that the Navy of the 1990s lacked a
near-peer competitor and faced pressure to shrink, it is not surprising that the
innovation cycle took on a different character than had been the case during the
Cold War. The service realized it had to do more with less, and understandably
it viewed RMA-era technology as a way to square the circle. Absent the requirement to establish sea control to protect trade routes or to do battle on the high
seas, the Navy gradually migrated to the idea that a central purpose of the fleet
was to support operations ashore through strikes, in addition to close-to-shore
maritime operations conducted to preserve freedom of maneuver. An original
purpose of the DDG-1000 was to fire at targets ashore in support of troops, with
the idea that the ships would have to sail relatively close to shore to do so. In
2017, the Navy shifted the emphasis to shooting at other surface ships. The LCS
focused on support operations close to shore to deal with enemy vessel swarms
and mines, among other things.
Unfortunately, even as the Navy struggled to operationalize these two innovative new platforms, the strategic environment changed. The irony is that, while
the United States focused on the inconclusive, irregular land wars in the Middle
East and Afghanistan—in which indirect fire from Navy ships frankly was not relevant—competitors emerged (or returned) with new capabilities to challenge the
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Navy both at sea and in operations close to shore, via development of land-based
antiship missiles that could overwhelm the fleet’s antimissile defenses.
It is clear that the post-1990s innovation effort was shaped and disrupted by
many different factors:
• Bureaucratic and programmatic difficulties in bringing ideas from the drawing board into being as actual systems that could be delivered to the fleet
• An ever-widening chasm between ponderous ship-development and acquisition cycles and the pace of change in technologies
• Management failures within the Navy that prevented the innovation cycle
from moving at a predictable, affordable pace to deliver systems that worked
as advertised
• Failure of oversight bodies in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
White House, and Congress to force the Navy into corrective actions that
might have kept the innovation cycle on track
• A lack of strategic consensus on the role of America’s armed forces, which
left the Navy to its own devices in connecting its systems to a clearly defined
maritime strategy or a compelling rationale for its existence; in the absence of
a clearly defined strategy, the Navy gravitated to strike operations, including
direct support of ground forces, missing the opportunity to explore whether
cheaper unmanned systems could perform the same missions for less money
• The shaping of the cycle by excessive cost growth at every step, which ensured (and still ensures) that budgets simply will not support the purchase
of the proposed numbers of new ships, representing a disconnect of monumental proportions and a failure to ground the innovation cycle in a coherent
linkage of ends, ways, and means
Action-reaction cycles remain a timeless feature within militaries—at least
for those intent on staying ahead of their adversaries. The Navy faces significant
hurdles to ensuring that the conceptual and systemic flaws that produced these
three platforms during the 1990s are not repeated. In addition to these flaws,
hanging over Richardson’s call for a redesigned fleet is the critical issue of money.
Naval innovation cycles need money, and lots of it, and it is not clear that there is
enough of it to go around, even in the United States.68
All is not lost, however. Out of the ashes of the 1990s cycle can spring innovative ideas, technologies, and concepts of operations that can be generalized for
a redesigned fleet. Perhaps the technologies of the DDG-1000 can be adapted
usefully and applied in different and more-workable ways on new platforms. The
same holds true for the LCS. The Navy must sift through these ashes carefully to
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glean the ideas and practices it should use as the basis for a redesigned fleet. This
must start as an inherently intellectual exercise, which in itself requires the institution to be capable of conducting critical self-evaluation before it takes corrective
action.
Moreover, political and military leaders need to articulate clearly a set of strategic priorities that the bureaucracy and other stakeholders in the process can operationalize into weapon systems. Admiral Richardson’s call to arms that focused
the Navy on overcoming its enemies in war on the high seas indeed may have a
galvanizing effect, producing a shortened, more sensible innovation cycle that the
bureaucracy can generalize, leading to the sought-after, redesigned, twenty-firstcentury fleet.
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